Pricing and Investments in Internet Security: A Cyber-Insurance
  Perspective by Pal, Ranjan & Golubchik, Leana
ar
X
iv
:1
10
3.
15
52
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  8
 M
ar 
20
11
1
Pricing and Investments in Internet Security
A Cyber-Insurance Perspective
Ranjan Pal, Student Member, IEEE, Leana Golubchik, Member, IEEE,
Abstract
Internet users such as individuals and organizations are subject to different types of epidemic risks such as worms,
viruses, spams, and botnets. To reduce the probability of risk, an Internet user generally invests in traditional security
mechanisms like anti-virus and anti-spam software, sometimes also known as self-defense mechanisms. However,
such software does not completely eliminate risk. Recent works have considered the problem of residual risk
elimination by proposing the idea of cyber-insurance. In this regard, an important research problem is the analysis
of optimal user self-defense investments and cyber-insurance contracts under the Internet environment.
In this paper, we investigate two problems and their relationship: 1) analyzing optimal self-defense investments
in the Internet, under optimal cyber-insurance coverage, where optimality is an insurer objective and 2) designing
optimal cyber-insurance contracts for Internet users, where a contract is a (premium, coverage) pair. By the term
‘self-defense investment’, we mean the monetary-cum-precautionary cost that each user needs to invest in employing
risk mitigating self-defense mechanisms, given that it is optimally insured by Internet insurance agencies. We propose
1) a general mathematical framework by which co-operative and non-co-operative Internet users can decide whether
or not to invest in self-defense for ensuring both, individual and social welfare and 2) models to evaluate optimal
cyber-insurance contracts in a single cyber-insurer setting. Our results show that co-operation amongst users results
in more efficient self-defense investments than those in a non-cooperative setting, under full insurance coverage,
in an ideal single insurer cyber-insurance market, whereas in non-ideal single insurer markets of non-cooperative
users, partial insurance driven self-defense investments are optimal. We also show the existence of a cyber-insurance
market in a single cyber-insurer scenario.
Keywords: cyber-insurance, self-defense investments, information asymmetry
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become a fundamental and an integral part of our daily lives. Billions of people nowadays are
using the Internet for various types of applications. However, all these applications are running on a network, that
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2was built under assumptions, some of which are no longer valid for today’s applications, e,g., that all users on the
Internet can be trusted and that there are no malicious elements propagating in the Internet. On the contrary, the
infrastructure, the users, and the services offered on the Internet today are all subject to a wide variety of risks.
These risks include denial of service attacks, intrusions of various kinds, hacking, phishing, worms, viruses, spams,
etc. In order to counter the threats posed by the risks, Internet users1 have traditionally resorted to antivirus and
anti-spam softwares, firewalls, and other add-ons to reduce the likelihood of being affected by threats. In practice, a
large industry (companies like Norton, Symantec, McAfee, etc.) as well as considerable research efforts are centered
around developing and deploying tools and techniques to detect threats and anomalies in order to protect the Internet
infrastructure and its users from the negative impact of the anomalies.
In the past one and half decade, protection techniques from a variety of computer science fields such as
cryptography, hardware engineering, and software engineering have continually made improvements. Inspite of
such improvements, recent articles by Schneier [28] and Anderson [2][3] have stated that it is impossible to achieve
a 100% Internet security protection. The authors attribute this impossibility primarily to four reasons: 1) new viruses,
worms, spams, and botnets evolve periodically at a rapid pace and as result it is extremely difficult and expensive
to design a security solution that is a panacea for all risks, 2) the Internet is a distributed system, where the system
users have divergent security interests and incentives, leading to the problem of ‘misaligned incentives’ amongst
users. For example, a rational Internet user might well spend $20 to stop a virus trashing its hard disk, but would
hardly have any incentive to invest sufficient amounts in security solutions to prevent a service-denial attack on a
wealthy corporation like an Amazon or a Microsoft [32]. Thus, the problem of misaligned incentives can be resolved
only if liabilities are assigned to parties (users) that can best manage risk, 3) the risks faced by Internet users are
often correlated and interdependent. A user taking protective action in an Internet like distributed system creates
positive externalities [14] for other networked users that in turn may discourage them from making appropriate
security investments, leading to the ‘free-riding’ problem [6][10][20][22], and 4) network externalities affect the
adoption of technology. Katz and Shapiro [12] have analyzed that externalities lead to the classic S-shaped adoption
curve, according to which slow early adoption gives way to rapid deployment once the number of users reaches a
critical mass. The initial deployment is subject to user benefits exceeding adoption costs, which occurs only if a
minimum number of users adopt a technology; so everyone might wait for others to go first, and the technology
never gets deployed. For example, DNSSEC, and S-BGP are secure protocols that have been developed to better
DNS and BGP in terms of security performance. However, the challenge is getting them deployed by providing
sufficient internal benefits to adopting firms.
In view of the above mentioned inevitable barriers to 100% risk mitigation, the need arises for alternative
1The term ‘users’ may refer to both, individuals and organizations.
3methods of risk management in the Internet. Anderson and Moore [3] state that microeconomics, game theory, and
psychology will play as vital a role in effective risk management in the modern and future Internet, as did the
mathematics of cryptography a quarter century ago. In this regard, cyber-insurance is a psycho-economic-driven
risk-management technique, where risks are transferred to a third party, i.e., an insurance company, in return for
a fee, i.e., the insurance premium. The concept of cyber-insurance is growing in importance amongst security
engineers. The reason for this is three fold: 1) ideally, cyber-insurance increases Internet safety because the insured
increases self-defense as a rational response to the reduction in insurance premium [11][13][30][35]. This fact
has also been mathematically proven by the authors in [15][18], 2) in the IT industry, the mindset of ‘absolute
protection’ is slowly changing with the realization that absolute security is impossible and too expensive to even
approach while adequate security is good enough to enable normal functions - the rest of the risk that cannot be
mitigated can be transferred to a third party [19], and 3) cyber-insurance will lead to a market solution that will be
aligned with economic incentives of cyber-insurers and users (individuals/organizations) - the cyber-insurers will
earn profit from appropriately pricing premiums, whereas users will seek to hedge potential losses. In practice,
users generally employ a simultaneous combination of retaining, mitigating, and insuring risks [29].
Sufficient evidence exists in daily life (e.g., in the form of auto and health insurance) as well as in the academic
literature (specifically focused on cyber-insurance) [11][13][15][18][30] that insurance-based solutions are useful
approaches to pursue, i.e., as a complement to other security measures (e.g., anti-virus software). However, cyber-
insurance has not yet become a reality due to a number of unresolved research challenges as well as practical
considerations (as detailed below). A number of these challenges are rooted in the differences between cyber-
insurance and other forms of insurance. Specifically, these include:
• Networked environment. The operation of systems and applications in a networked environments leads to
new insurance challenges. Specifically, the network’s topology, node connectivity, form of interaction among
the nodes, all lead to subsequent risk propagation characteristics. This in turn implies that considerations of
interdependent security and correlated risk (among system participants) are significantly more complex in an
Internet-type environment. All this leads to challenges in modeling of network topologies, risk arrival, attacker
models, and so on.
• Information asymmetry. Information asymmetry has a significant effect on most insurance environments,
where typical considerations include inability to distinguish between users of different types as well as
users undertaking actions that affect loss probability after the insurance contract is signed. However, there
are important aspects of information asymmetry that are particular to cyber-insurance. These include users
hiding information from insurers, users lacking information aout networked nodes, as well as insurers lacking
information about and not differentiating based on products (e.g., anti-virus software) installed by users. All
4this leads to challenges in modeling insurers and insured entities.
In this paper, we address the problem of pricing and investments in Internet security related to cyber-insurance-
driven risk management under a correlated, interdependent, and information asymmetric Internet environment. Our
problem is important because 1) for cyber-insurance to be popular amongst Internet users, a market for it should
first exist, which in turn depends on the prices charged by the cyber-insurer (supply side) to its clients (demand
side) and the subsequent profits earned and 2) once a market for cyber-insurance exists, Internet users would
want to invest optimally in self-defense investments, given insurance coverage, so as to improve overall security.
Optimal user investments is important for two reasons: 1) investing in self-defense mechanisms reduces a user’s
probability of facing risk. Given that a user has cyber-insurance coverage, increase in user self-defense investments
reduces its premium charged by the cyber-insurer. Thus, its important to characterize the appropriate amounts of
investments by a user in self-defense, as well as in cyber-insurance, such that it maximizes its utility and 2) many
distributed Internet applications like peer-to-peer file sharing, multicasting, and network resource sharing encourage
co-operation between users to improve overall system performance. In regard to security investments, cooperation
invites an opportunity for a user to benefit from the positive externality2 that its investment poses on the other users
in the network. However, its not evident that users invest better when they cooperate compared to when they do
not, in regard to the network achieving greater overall security. In this paper, we want to study whether security
investments are more efficient under cooperation than under non cooperation when it comes to achieving better
overall network security.
We make the following research contributions in this paper. Before stating them, we emphasize that they are
based on the expected utility theory model by von-Neumann and Morgenstern, which is the most widely used theory
for analyzing micro-economic models. We also assume in all our models the presence of only one cyber-insurer
providing service to its clients (Internet users).
1) We quantitatively analyze an n-agent model, using botnet risks as a representative application, and propose
a general mathematical framework through which Internet users can decide 1) whether to invest and 2) how
much to invest in self-defense mechanisms, given that each user is optimally insured w.r.t. insurer objectives
in perfect single insurer cyber-insurance markets(see Section III). Our framework entails each Internet user to
invest optimally in self-defense mechanisms in order to improve overall network security, and is applicable
to all risk types that inflict direct and/or indirect losses to users.
2) For ideal3 single insurer cyber-insurance markets, we perform a mathematical comparative study to show
that cooperation amongst Internet users results in better self-defense investments w.r.t. improving overall
2An externality is a positive (external benefit) or negative(external cost) impact on a user not directly involved in an economic transaction.
3An insurance environment with no information asymmetry between the cyber-insurer and the insured.
5network security when the risks faced by the users in the Internet are interdependent (see Section IV). We
use basic concepts from both, cooperative and non cooperative game theory to support the claims we make
in Sections III and IV. Our results are applicable to both, co-operative (e.g., distributed file sharing) as well
as non-cooperative Internet applications, where in both application types a user has the option to be either
co-operative or non-cooperative with respect to security parameters.
3) We derive optimal cyber-insurance contracts ((premium, coverage) pairs) between the cyber-insurer and the
insured under both, ideal as well as non-ideal cyber-insurance environments, and show that a market for cyber-
insurance exists when there is a single cyber-insurer providing insurance to all Internet users (see Section V.
While existing literature show that information asymmetries leads to market failure, using mechanism design
theory, we design robust cyber-insurance contracts that account for information asymmetries, maximize cyber-
insurer profits, and are in market equilibrium.
Through our contributions, we jointly address an economics problem of both, the supply side (cyber-insurer) as well
as the demand side (cyber-insured) and study the relationship between the two, i.e., we study the effect that prices
set in a cyber-insurance contract has on the self-defense investment of an Internet user. For ease of presentation,
we first address the investment problem of Internet user under a given cyber-insurance contract followed by the
problem of pricing optimal cyber-insurance contracts. We do this because cyber-insurers are the first movers and
account for optimal self-defense investments of Internet users when designing optimal insurance contracts.
II. RELATED WORK
The field of cyber-insurance in networked environments has been triggered by recent results on the amount of indi-
vidual user self-defense investments in the presence of network externalities. The authors in [6][10][16][17][20][22]
mathematically show that Internet users invest too little in self-defense mechanisms relative to the socially efficient
level, due to the presence of network externalities. These works just highlight the role of positive externalities
in preventing users for investing optimally in self-defense investments. Thus, the challenge to improving overall
network security lies in incentivizing end-users to invest in sufficient amount of self-defense investments inspite of
the positive externalities they experience from other users in the network. In response to the challenge, the works
in [16][17] modeled network externalities and showed that a tipping phenomenon is possible, i.e., in a situation of
low level of self-defense, if a certain fraction of population decides to invest in self-defense mechanisms, it could
trigger a large cascade of adoption in security features, thereby strengthening the overall Internet security. However,
they did not state how the tipping phenomenon could be realized in practice. In a series of recent works [15][18],
Lelarge and Bolot have stated that under conditions of no information asymmetry [1][8] between the insurer and the
insured, cyber-insurance incentivizes Internet user investments in self-defense mechanisms, thereby paving the path
6to trigger a cascade of adoption. They also show that investments in both self-defense mechanisms and insurance
schemes are quite inter-related in maintaining a socially efficient level of security on the Internet.
Inspite of Lelarge and Bolot proposing the role of cyber-insurance for networked environments in incentivizing
increasing user security investments, its common knowledge that the market for cyber-insurance has not blossomed
with respect to its promised potential. Most recent works [21][4] have attributed the underdeveloped market for
cyber-insurance due to 1. interdependent security, 2. correlated risk, and 3. information asymmetries. Thus, the
need of the hour is to develop cyber-insurance solutions simultaneously targeting these three issues and identify
other factors that might play an important role in promoting a developed cyber-insurance market. The works in
[31][15][18] [7] touch upon the notion of information asymmetry and the effect it has on the insurance parameters,
however none of the works explicitly model information asymmetry. In relation to tackling information asymmetry,
the authors in [21][7][15] propose the concept of premium differentiation and fines, but none of the works provide an
analytical model to strengthen their point. In addition, no work considers the cooperative and non cooperative nature
of network users and the effect this has on the overall level of security and appropriate self-defense investments.
III. A MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK FOR SELF-DEFENSE INVESTMENTS
In this section, we propose a general mathematical framework for deciding on the appropriate self-defense
investment of an Internet user, under optimal cyber-insurance coverage, in ideal single insurer cyber-insurance
markets. Here, we assume that Internet users could buy insurance from entities like Internet service providers
(ISPs) to cover the risks posed by botnets4. For instance, the coverage could be in the form of money or protection
against lost data/reputation. Our framework is applicable to direct/indirect risks, those that are caused by worms,
viruses, and botnets. Direct risks result when threats such as worms, viruses, and botnets infect machines (computing
device) that lack a security feature, whereas indirect losses result due to the contagion process of one machine
getting infected by its neighbors.
A. Model Description
We consider n identical5 rational risk-averse users in a network, i.e., E(U(w)) < U(E(w)), where w is the
wealth possessed by a user. We assume the users to be cooperative to a variable degree, i.e, the network supports
Internet applications where users cooperate with other users in some capacity with the intention to improve overall
system performance but may or may not cooperate entirely. The users could either voluntarily cooperate by sharing
information with other network users regarding self-defense investments, or be bound to cooperate due to a network
regulation, which requires participating users to share self-defense investment information. The users may also decide
4Cyber-insurance providers could also be third-party agencies other than ISPs or the government.
5We assume identical users to ensure tractable analyses.
7not to cooperate at all depending on the nature of applications. Each user has initial wealth w0 and is exposed to a
substantial risk of size R with a certain probability p0. (Here, risk represents the negative wealth accumulated by
a user when it is affected by Internet threats.)
A user investing in self-defense mechanisms reduces its risk probability. For an amount x, invested in self-
defense, a user faces a risk probability of p(x), which is a continuous and twice differentiable decreasing function
of investment, i.e., p′(x) < 0, p′′(x) > 0, limx→∞p(x) = 0, and limx→∞p′(x) = 0. The investment x is a function
of the amount of security software the user buys and the effort it spends on maintaining security settings on its
computing device. In addition to investing in self-defense mechanisms, a user either finds it optimal to buy either
full or partial cyber-insurance coverage at a particular premium to eliminate its residual risk. The premium and
coverage applicable to users are determined through optimal cyber-insurance contracts that we will investigate in
Section V. A user does not buy insurance for high probability low risk events because 1) these events are extremely
common and does not cause sufficient damage to demand insurance solutions and 2) the insurance company also
has reservations in insuring every kind of risk for profit purposes. We also assume for the moment that there
exists markets for cyber-insurance, i.e., cyber-insurance strengthens overall network security and there exists cyber-
insurance contracts that are in market equilibrium. We will show in Section V that markets can be made to exist
for single-insurer cyber-insurance environments.
An Internet user apart from being directly affected by threats may be indirectly infected by the other Internet users.
We denote the indirect risk facing probability of a user i as q(−→x −i, n), where −→x −i = (x1, ......, xi−1, xi+1, ...., xn)
is the vector of self-defense investments of users other than i. An indirect infection spread is either ‘perfect’ or
‘imperfect’ in nature. In a perfect spread, infection spreads from a user to other users in the network with probability
1, whereas in case of imperfect spread, infection spreads from a user to others with probability less than 1. For
a perfect information spread q(−→x −i, n) = 1 −
∏n
j=1,j 6=i(1 − p(xj)), whereas in the case of imperfect spread,
q(−→x −i, n) < 1 −
∏n
j=1,j 6=i(1 − p(xj)). In this paper, we consider perfect spread only, without loss of generality
because the probability of getting infected by others in the case of imperfect spread is less than that in the case of
perfect spread, and as a result this case is subsumed by the results of the perfect spread case. Under perfect spread,
the risk probability of a user i is given as
p(xi) + (1− p(xi))q(
−→x −i, n) = 1−
n∏
j=1
(1− p(xj)) (1)
and its expected final wealth upon facing risk is denoted as w0−xi− (1−
∏n
j=1(1−p(xj)) · IC)−R+ IC , where
(1−
∏n
j=1(1− p(xj)) · IC is the premium and IC denotes the insurance coverage6. The aim of a network user is
to invest in self-defense mechanisms in such a manner so as to either maximize its expected utility of final wealth,
6For full insurance coverage R = IC.
8or maximize the expected utility of net wealth in the network system, depending on the nature of the application.
B. Mathematical Framework for Full Insurance Coverage
In this section, we assume full cyber-insurance coverage and propose a general mathematical framework for
deciding on the appropriate self-defense investment of an Internet user. It has been proved in [33] that under fair
premiums and in ideal insurance environments, a user finds its optimal to buy full coverage. In other situations, a
user might buy full coverage but it might not be optimal for itself as it may end up paying unfair premiums to the
insurer, who does not want to make negative profits. Thus, we assume here that full coverage is optimal for users
under ideal cyber-insurance environments, given that users would only want to be charged fair premiums.
We model the following risk management scenarios: (1) users do not cooperate and do not get infected by other
users in the network, (2) users cooperate and may get infected by other users in the network, (3) users do not
cooperate but may get infected by other users in the network, and (4) users cooperate but do not get infected by
other users in the network. We note that Case 4 is a special case of Case 2 and thus is subsumed in the results of
Section III-B2. Scenarios 2 and 3 are realistic in the Internet where risks do spread even though applications may
or may not allow co-operation. Scenarios 1 and 4 are idealistic cases and are analyzed for pathological reasons as
well as for purposes of comparison with scenarios 2 and 3 w.r.t. optimal self-defense investments.
1) Case 1: No Cooperation, No Infection Spread: Under full insurance, the risk is equal to the insurance coverage,
and users determine their optimal amount of self-defense investment by maximizing their level of final wealth, which
in turn is equivalent to maximizing their expected utility of wealth [9]. We can determine the optimal amount of
self-defense investment for each user i by solving for the value of p that maximizes the following constrained
optimization problem:
argmaxxiFWi(xi) = w0 − xi − p(xi)R−R+ IC
or
argmaxxiFWi(xi) = w0 − xi − p(xi)R
subject to
0 ≤ p(xi) ≤ p0,
where FWi is the final wealth of user i and p(xi)R is the premium for full insurance coverage. Taking the first
and second derivatives of FWi with respect to xi, we obtain
FW ′i (xi) = −1− p
′(xi)R (2)
9and
FW ′′i (xi) = −p
′′(xi)R < 0 (3)
Thus, our objective function is globally concave. Let xopti be the optimal xi obtained by equating the first derivative
to 0. Thus, we have:
p′(xopti )R = −1. (4)
Economic Interpretation: The left hand side (LHS) of Equation (4) is the marginal benefit of investing an
additional dollar in self-protection mechanisms, whereas the right hand side (RHS) denotes the marginal cost of
the investment. A user equates the LHS with the RHS to determine its self-defense investment.
Conditions for Investment: We first investigate the boundary costs. The user will not consider investing in self-
defense if p′(0)R ≥ −1 because its marginal cost of investing in any defense mechanism, i.e., -1, will be relatively
equal to or lower than the marginal benefit when no investment occurs. In this case, xopti = 0. If the user invests
such that it has no exposure to risk, xopti = ∞. When p′(0)R < −1, the costs do not lie on the boundary, i.e.,
0 < xopti <∞, and the user invests to partially eliminate risk (see Equation (4)).
2) Case 2: Cooperation, Infection Spread: Under full insurance coverage, user i’s expected final wealth is given
by
FWi = FW (xi,
−→x −i) = w0 − xi − (1−
n∏
j=1
(1− p(xj)))R (5)
When Internet users co-operate, they jointly determine their optimal self-defense investments. We assume that co-
operation and bargaining costs are nil. In such a case, according to Coase theorem [26], the optimal investments
for users are determined by solving for the socially optimal investment values that maximize the aggregate final
wealth (AFW) of all users. Thus, we have the following constrained optimization problem:
argmaxxi,−→x −iAFW = nw0 −
n∑
i=1
xi − n(1−
n∏
j=1
(1− p(xj)))R
0 ≤ pi(xi) ≤ p0, ∀i
Taking the first and the second partial derivatives of the aggregate final wealth with respect to xi, we obtain
∂
∂xi
(AFW ) = −1− np′(xi)
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− p(xj))R (6)
and
∂2
∂x2i
(AFW ) = −np′′(xi)
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− p(xj))R < 0 (7)
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The objective function is globally concave, which implies the existence of a unique solution xopti (−→x −i), for each
−→x −i. Our maximization problem is symmetric for all i, and thus the optimal solution is given by xopti (
−−→
x
opt
−i ) =
x
opt
j (
−−→
x
opt
−j ) for all j = 2, ...., n. We obtain the optimal solution by equating the first derivative to zero, which gives
us the following equation
np′(xopti (
−→x −i))
∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− p(xi))R = −1 (8)
Economic Interpretation: The left hand side (LHS) of Equation (8) is the marginal benefit of investing in self-
defense. The right hand side (RHS) of Equation (8) is the marginal cost of investing in self-defense, i.e., -1. We
obtain the former term of the marginal benefit by internalizing the positive externality7, i.e., by accounting for
the self-defense investments of other users in the network. The external well-being posed to other users by user i
when it invests an additional dollar in self-defense is −p′(xi)
∏n
j=1,j 6=i(1 − p(xi)). This is the amount by which
the likelihood of each of the other users getting infected is reduced, when user i invests an additional dollar.
Conditions for Investment: If np′(0)∏nj=1,j 6=i(1− p(xj))R ≥ −1, it is not optimal to invest any amount in self-
defense because the marginal cost of investing in defense mechanisms is relatively equal to or less than the marginal
benefit of the joint reduction in risks to individuals when no investment occurs. In this case, the optimal value is
a boundary investment, i.e., xopti (
−→x −i) = 0. If the user invests such that it has no exposure to risk, xopti =∞. In
cases where np′(0)
∏n
j=1,j 6=i(1− p(xj))R < −1, the optimal probabilities do not lie on the boundary and the user
invests to partially eliminate risk (see Equation (8)).
3) Case 3: No Cooperation, Infection Spread: We assume that users do not co-operate with each other on the
level of investment, i.e., users are selfish. In such a case, the optimal level of self-defense investment is the pure
strategy Nash equilibria of the normal form game, G = (N,A, ui(s)), played by the users [5]. The game consists of
two players, i.e., |N | = n; the action set of G is A =
∏n
i=1×Ai, where Ai ǫ [0,∞], and the utility/payoff function
ui(s) for each player i is their individual final wealth, where s ǫ
∏n
i=1×Ai. The pure strategy Nash equilibria of
a normal form game is the intersection of the best response functions of each user [5].
We define the best response function of user i, xbesti (
−→x −i), as
xbesti (
−→x −i) ǫ argmaxxiFWi(xi,
−→x −i),
where
FWi(xi,
−→x −i) = w0 − xi − (1−
n∏
j=1
(1− p(xj)))R (9)
7Internalizing a positive externality refers to rewarding a user, who contributes positively and without compensation, to the well-being of
other users, through its actions.
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Taking the first and second partial derivative of FWi(xi,−→x −i)with respect to xi and equating it to zero, we obtain
∂
∂xi
(FWi(xi,
−→x −i)) = −1− p
′(xi)
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− p(xj))R (10)
and
∂2
∂x2i
(FWi(xi,
−→x −i)) = −p
′′(xi)
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− p(xj))R < 0 (11)
Thus, our objective function is globally concave, which implies a unique solution xbesti (−→x −i) for each −→x −i. We
also observe that a particular user i’s strategy complements user j’s strategy for all j, which implies that only
symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria exist. The optimal investment for user i is determined by the following
equation:
∂
∂xi
(FWi(xi,
−→x −i)) = −1− p
′(xi)
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− p(xj))R = 0 (12)
Economic Interpretation: The left hand side (LHS) of Equation (12) is the marginal benefit of investing in self-
defense. The right hand side (RHS) of Equation (12) is the marginal cost of investing in self-defense, i.e., -1. Since
the users cannot co-operate on the level of investment in self-defense mechanisms, it is not possible for them to
benefit from the positive externality that their investments pose to each other.
Conditions for Investment: If p′(0)∏nj=1,j 6=i(1 − p(xj))R ≥ −1, it is not optimal to invest any amount in self-
defense because the marginal cost of investing in defense mechanisms is greater than the marginal benefit of the
joint reduction in risks to individuals when no investment occurs. In this case, the optimal value is a boundary
investment, i.e., xbesti (
−→x −i) = 0. If the user invests such that it has no exposure to risk, xopti =∞. In cases where
p′(0)
∏n
j=1,j 6=i(1 − p(xj))R < −1, the optimal probabilities do not lie on the boundary and the user invests to
partially eliminate risk (see Equation (12)).
Multiplicity of Nash Equilibria: Due to the symmetry of our pure strategy Nash equilibria and the increasing
nature of the best response functions, there always exists an odd number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria, i.e.,
xbesti (
−→x best−i ) = x
best
j (
−→x best−j ) for all j = 2, . . . , n.
C. Optimal Investments Under Partial Insurance Coverage
In this section, we analyze the situation of optimal self-defense investments when the cyber-insurance agency
finds it optimal to provide partial coverage to its clients. This situation arises mainly due to conditions of information
asymmetry in the insurance environment, when partial coverage is necessary to ensure a market for cyber-insurance
(see Section V). We only assume the realistic case of information asymmetry arising in a non-cooperative Internet
environment as co-operative Internet users would want social welfare and would not generally want to hide relevant
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details from the cyber-insurer.
1) Case A: No Co-operation, No Infection Spread: Under partial insurance, users determine their optimal amount
of self-defense investment by maximizing their expected utility of final wealth, which is not equivalent to maximizing
the expected final wealth [9]. Thus, we have to perform our analysis based on utility functions rather than based
on the expected value of final wealth.
Let U() be an increasing and concave utility function for each user in the network such that U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0.
We can determine the optimal amount of self-defense investment for each user i by solving for the value of pi that
maximizes the following constrained optimization problem:
argmaxpiUFW (pi) = U(w0 − x(p0 − pi)− pi · (R−D))
0 ≤ pi ≤ p0,
where UFW is the utility of final wealth of a user, x(∆p), a function of the difference of p0 and pi, represents
user i’s cost of reducing the risk probability from p0 to pi, ∆p = p0 − pi, and 0 < D < R is the deductible in
cyber-insurance. We assume that x is monotonically increasing and twice differentiable with x(0) = 0, x′(0) > 0,
and x′′(0) > 0, and pi · (R −D) is the actuarially fair premium for user i’s partial insurance coverage.
2) Case B: No Co-operation, Infection Spread: Under conditions of infection spread in a non-cooperative Internet
environment, user i’s expected utility of final wealth when a deductible of D is imposed on itself is given as
UFWi = UFWi(pi, p−i,D) = α+ β, (13)
where
α =
n∏
i=1
(1− pi)U(w0 − x(∆pi)− P (D)) (14)
and
β = 1−
n∏
j=1
(1− pj)U(w0 − x(p0 − pi)− P (D)−D) (15)
We define P (D) as the actuarially fair premium, and it is expressed as
P (D) = 1−
n∏
j=1
(1− pj)(R −D) (16)
Since there is spread of infection and that the Internet environment is non co-operative, we have a non co-operative
game of self-defense investments between the Internet users. We denote the best response of user i under a deductible
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as the solution to the following constrained optimization problem:
pbestDi (p−i,D) ǫ argmaxpiUFW (pi, p−i)
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, ∀i
The intersection of the best responses of the users form the set of Nash equilibria of the investment game.
IV. COMPARATIVE STUDY
In this section, we compare the optimal level of investments under full cyber-insurance coverage in the context
of various cases discussed in the previous section. We emphasize here that greater the self-defense investments
made by a user, better it is for the security of the whole network. Our results are applicable to Internet applications
where a user has the option to be either co-operative or non-cooperative with respect to security parameters.
A. Case 3 versus Case 1
The following lemma gives the result of comparing Case 3 and Case 1.
Lemma 1. If Internet users do not co-operate on their self-defense investments (i.e., do not account for the
positive externality posed by other Internet users), in any Nash equilibrium in Case 3, the users inefficiently under-
invest in self-defense as compared to the case where users do not cooperate and there is no infection spread.
Proof. In Case 1, the condition for any user i not investing in any self-defense is −p′(0)R ≤ 1. The condition
implies that −1 − p′(0)
∏n
j=1,j 6=i(1 − p(xj))R < 0 for all
−→x −i. The latter expression is the condition for non-
investment in Case 3. Thus, for all users i, xopti = 0 in Case 1 implies xbesti = 0 in Case 3, i.e., x
opt
i (
−−→
x
opt
−i ) =
xbesti (
−−→
xbest−i ) = 0,∀i. The condition for optimal investment of user i in Case 1 is −1 − p′(xi)R = 0. Hence,
−1 − p′(xi)
∏n
j=1,j 6=i(1 − p(xj))R < 0, for all x−i. Thus, in situations of self-investment for user i, x
opt
i > 0 in
Case 1 implies 0 ≤ xbesti < x
opt
i , for all x−i, in Case 3, i.e., x
opt
i (
−−→
x
opt
−i ) > x
best
i (
−−→
xbest−i ) ≥ 0,∀i. Therefore, under
non-cooperative settings, a user always under-invests in self-defense mechanisms. 
B. Case 3 versus Case 2
The following lemma gives the result of comparing Case 3 and Case 2.
Lemma 2. Under environments of infection spread, an Internet user co-operating with other users on its self-
defense investment (i.e., accounts for the positive externality posed by other Internet users), always invests at least
as much as in the case when it does not co-operate.
Proof. In Case 2, the condition for any user i not investing in any self-defense mechanism is −1 − np′(0)(1 −
p(0))n−1R ≤ 0. The condition also implies that −1 − np′(0)(1 − p(0))n−1R ≤ 0. The latter expression is the
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condition in Case 3 for an Internet user not investing in any self-defense mechanism. Thus, for all users i, xopti = 0
in Case 2 implies xbesti = 0, for all Nash equilibrium in Case 3, i.e., x
opt
i (
−−→
x
opt
−i ) = x
best
i (
−−→
xbest−i ) = 0,∀i. The
condition for optimal investment of each user i in Case 2 is −1− np′(xopti (
−−→
x
opt
−i )(1− p(x
opt
i (
−−→
x
opt
−i ))
n−1R = 0. The
latter expression implies −1− p′(xopti (
−−→
x
opt
−i )(1 − p(x
opt
i (
−−→
x
opt
−i ))
n−1R < 0. Hence xopti (
−−→
x
opt
−i ) > x
best
i (
−−→
xbest−i ) ≥ 0,∀i.
Therefore, under environments of infection spread, a user in Case 3 always under invests in self-defense mechanisms
when compared to a user in Case 2. 
C. Case 2 versus Case 1
The following lemma gives the result of comparing Case 2 and Case 1.
Lemma 3. In any n-agent cyber-insurance model, where p(0) < 1− n−1
√
1
n
, it is always better for Internet users
to invest more in self-defense in a co-operative setting with infection spread than in a non-co-operative setting with
no infection spread.
Proof. In Case 1, the condition for any user i not investing in any self-defense is −p′(0)R ≤ 1. The condition
implies that −1 − np′(0)(1 − p(0))n−1R ≤ 0 for all p0 < 1 − n−1
√
1
n
. Thus, for all i, xopti (
−−→
x
opt
−i ) = 0 in Case 1
implies xopti (
−−→
x
opt
−i ) ≥ 0 in Case 3 if and only if p0 < 1− n−1
√
1
n
. In situations of non-zero investment
−1− np′(xi(
−→x −i))(1 − p(xi(
−→x −i))
n−1)R > −1− p′(xi(
−→x −i)),∀i, ∀xi(
−→x −i),
if and only if p(xi(−→x −i)) < 1− n−1
√
1
n
. Hence,
−1− np′(xopti (
−−→
x
opt
−i )(1− p(x
opt
i (
−−→
x
opt
−i ))
n−1)R > −1− p′(xopti (
−−→
x
opt
−i )),∀i,
where xopti (
−−→
x
opt
−i ) is the optimal investment in Case 2. Since the expected final wealth of a user in Case 1 is concave
in xi(−→x −i), xopti (
−−→
x
opt
−i ) in Case 2 is greater than x
opt
i (
−−→
x
opt
−i ) in Case 1. Thus, we infer that investments made by
users in Case 2 are always greater than those made by users in Case 1 when the risk probability is less than a
threshold value that decreases with increase in the number of Internet users. Hence, in the limit as the number of
users tends towards infinity, the lemma holds for all p0. 
The basic intuition behind the results in the above three lemmas is that internalizing the positive effects on other
Internet users leads to better and appropriate self-defense investments for users. We also emphasize that our result
trends hold true in case of heterogenous network users because irrespective of the type of users, co-operating on
investments always leads to users accounting for the positive externality and investing more efficiently. The only
difference in case of heterogenous network user scenarios could be the value of probability thresholds i.e., p(0)
(this value would be different for each user in the network), under which the above lemmas hold.
Based on the above three lemmas, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 1. If Internet users cannot contract on the externalities, in any Nash equilibrium, Internet users
inefficiently under-invest in self-defense, that is compared to the socially optimal level of investment in self-defense.
In addition, in any Nash equilibrium, a user invests less in self-defense than if they did not face the externality.
Furthermore, if p(0) < 1 − n−1
√
1
n
, the socially optimal level of investment in self-defense is higher compared to
the level if Internet users did not face the externality.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the results in Lemmas 1, 2, and 3. 
The theorem implies that when negotiations could be carried out by a regulator (ex., an ISP) amongst Internet
users in a cooperative setting, inevitable network externalities could be internalized and as a result users who benefit
from the externality would be required to invest considerably in self-defense investments, thereby improving overall
network security. The negotiations cannot not be conducted in a non-cooperative setting and as a result users would
not pay for the benefits obtained from the positive externalities, thereby investing suboptimally.
V. OPTIMAL CYBER-INSURANCE CONTRACTS
In this section, we discuss the problem of optimal insurance contracts. We make two contributions in this
section: 1) we derive optimal cyber-insurance contracts under ideal insurance environments when no information
asymmetry exists between the cyber-insurer and the insured and 2) we derive optimal cyber-insurance contracts
under information asymmetry environments and show that a market exists for monopolistic insurance scenarios.
Once optimal contracts are set by the cyber-insurance agencies, Internet users decide on their optimal self-defense
investments given the optimal contracts.
A. Optimal Cyber-Insurance Contracts Under No Information Asymmetry
The main goal of this section is to derive optimal cyber-insurance contracts between the insurer and its clients
under conditions of no information asymmetry (for perfect insurance markets), where the insurer could have either
a social welfare maximizing mindset or a profit maximizing mindset. When an insurer has a social welfare mindset,
it does not care that much about making business profits as it does about insuring people so as to increase the
population of users investing in self-defense mechanisms. Its hard to think of any commercial organization in the
modern world who would want to provide service without thinking of profits. However, if ISPs would be a cyber-
insurance agency, it would want to secure itself, being a computing and networking entity. Given that an ISP is an
eyeball and the sink for many end-user flows, it would have a strong reason to ensure high security amongst its
clients as a primary objective, in order to strengthen its own security.
1) Model: We assume that Internet users are uniformly distributed on the line segment [0,1], i.e., the location
p ǫ [0, 1] of a particular user on the unit interval denotes its probability of facing a substantial risk of size R. This
is the risk a user faces after some initial investments, which are precautionary efforts both in the monetary, as well
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as in the non-monetary sense. We assume that the ISP (or any other insurance agency) could have an estimate of
this risk probability via the answers to some general questions (e.g., the type of anti-virus protection one uses, the
security mindset of a user, and some basic general knowledge of Internet security) it requires its potential clients
to answer before signing up for service, and from the network topology. The network topology gives information
about the node degrees, which in turn helps determine the probability of each user being affected by threats. Apart
from the probability of facing risk, the Internet users are assumed to be homogenous in terms of their initial wealth
w and the size R of risk faced, where a risk represents the negative wealth accumulated by a user when it is
affected by Internet threats. We assume that the potential risk faced by an Internet user is less than its initial wealth
w. Each user may buy at most one cyber-insurance policy from the insurer by agreeing to pay a premium z for
an insurance coverage amount c. The cyber-insurance company advertises only one contract to all its customers.
We assume that the level of coverage is not bigger than size R of risk. We also assume that the initial wealth of a
user, the size of risk, the cyber-insurance premium, and the level of coverage have the same measurable units. We
also account for the fact that the system does not face the information asymmetry problem. We apply a risk-averse
utility function Up(z, c) to Internet users, where Up(z, c) is defined as
Up(z, c) =


w − pKR if it buys no insurance
w − z − pK(R− c) if it buys insurance,
where K ≥ 1 is the degree8 of risk aversion of a user, assumed to be the same for all users in the network. When
K = 1, a user evaluates its loss to be exactly R. When K > 1, the user adds an additional negative utility of
(K − 1)R for an idiosyncratic pain due to facing the risk.
We assume that the cyber-insurance agency is risk-neutral, i.e., it is only concerned with its expected profits. For
an insurance policy (z, c) sold to a user, the contract is worth
(1− p)z + p(z − c) = z − pc (17)
to the insurer. Thus, the overall expected profit made by the cyber-insurance agency by providing the same insurance
service to its entire geographical locality is
G(z, c) =
∫ 1
0
(z − pc)dp (18)
Here, we use ‘contract’ and ‘policy’ interchangeably.
2) Welfare Maximizing Insurance: We now determine an optimal cyber-insurance policy, (z, c), a cyber-insurance
agency interested in maximizing social welfare would provide to its customers. We assume here that the insurer
8The degree of risk aversion mentioned in this paper could be any standard risk aversion measure such as the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion
measure [33].
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values the welfare of each of its customers equally and is not inclined to making negative profit. We also assume
that a user can decide whether to buy the policy or not, and that the insurer also has the power to decide whether
to provide insurance to a customer, based on its probability of facing risk.
Problem Formulation. Let the insurer offer a contract (z, c). An Internet user facing a probability of risk, p, will
want to buy cyber-insurance if Up(z, c) ≥ Up(0, 0). Thus, the following condition must hold for a user to buy
cyber-insurance
w − z − pK(R− c) ≥ w − pKR (19)
or,
p ≥
z
Kc
= pL(z, c) (20)
Therefore, a user buys insurance only if its risk probability is higher than some lower bound pL. The lower bound
is dependent on z, c, and K. We observe that for a fixed K, the lower the value of premium per unit coverage, the
higher is the incentive for a user to buy cyber-insurance.
On the other hand, the cyber-insurance agency may not allow every interested user to buy insurance. There exists
a particular value, pH , of the probability of risk, for which z = pHc. In such a case, the cyber-insurance company
breaks even and the resulting z is the fair premium. The insurance agency denies insurance service to users whose
probability of risk is greater than pH . Thus, pH is the upper bound of the risk probability that a user requiring
insurance can afford if it wants to claim insurance.
A cyber-insurer primarily interested in social welfare advertises a contract (z, c) that maximizes the total welfare of
all Internet users in its geographical locality without it making negative profits. Formally, we frame our optimization
problem as follows.
argmax(z,c)TW = A+B + C
subject toD,
where
A =
∫ pH
pL
[w − z − pK(R− c)]dp,
B =
∫ pL
0
(w − pKR)dp,
C =
∫ 1
pH
(w − pKR)dp,
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D =
∫ pH
pL
(z − pc)dp ≥ 0
A is the expected utility of all Internet users whose risk facing probability, p, lies in the interval [pL, pH ]. B
represents the expected utility of users who have no incentive to buy insurance. The risk probability of these users
lies in the interval [0, pL]. C stands for the expected utility of users who want to purchase cyber-insurance, but
are denied by the insurance agency. Their risk probabilities lie in the interval [pH , 1]. Finally, D represents the
constraint of the optimization problem, which states that the expected profits of the cyber-insurer are non-negative.
Results. We state our results through a theorem. We note that the terms ‘profits’ and ‘total user welfare’ refer to
the expected values of profits and social welfare.
Theorem 2. For a welfare-maximizing cyber-insurance contract, the optimal (premium, coverage) pair is (R,R); the
risk probability lower bound, pL, equals 1K ; pH = 1; total user welfare, TW, is (w − R 2K−12K ); and the insurer
profit, P, equals R (K−1)22K2 .
Proof. We first express the risk probability bounds, pL and pH , as functions of z,K, and c. In terms of z,K, and c,
pL is equal to zKc and pH equals
z
c
. Integrating the left hand side of constraint D in our optimization problem, we
obtain the cyber-insurer profits as c2
z2
c2
(K−1)2
K2
. Since the profits are always positive, the constraint D is not binding
on the optimization problem. Thus, our constrained optimization problem turns into the following unconstrained
one.
argmax(z,c)P −Q+ T − S,
where
P = (R − c
z
c
)(
K − 1
K
),
Q =
1
2
(R− c)
z2
c2
(
K2 − 1
K
),
T = w(1 −
z
c
+
z
Kc
),
and
S =
1
2
KR(1−
z2
c2
+
z2
c2 ·K2
)
The first partial derivative of the objective function with respect to c evaluates to z2
c2
, which is a strictly non-
negative quantity. Thus, the optimal value of the objective function lies at the maximum value c can assume, i.e.,
R. Substituting the optimal c in the objective function, we obtain a new unconstrained optimization problem of a
single variable as follows.
argmaxzX − Y − Z,
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where
X = (w −R
z
c
)
z
c
(
K − 1
K
),
Y =
w
K
(K −
z
c
(K − 1)),
and
Z =
R
2K
(K2 − (
z2
c2
)(K2 − 1))
The first derivative of the objective function evaluates to R z
c
(K−1)2
K
, which is a strictly non-negative quantity.
Therefore, the optimal value of the objective function lies at z = R, since any premium greater than R is unfair to
an insurance customer and would reduce social welfare. Using substitution, the optimal (premium, coverage) pair,
(R,R), leads to a pL value of 1K , TW value of (w −R
2K−1
2K ), and an insurer profit, P , equal to R
(K−1)2
2K2 . 
Theorem Implications: We infer that the optimal insurance coverage in a welfare maximizing scenario is ‘full
coverage’. For K = 1 the lower bound of risk facing probability, pL, is 1, and a user buys full cyber-insurance if it
is sure to face a risk, and in this case the insurer charges its client a fair premium R, i.e., probability of facing risk
× coverage (R) = R = premium charged. However, as the degree of risk averseness of a user increases, the value
of pL is less than one, and a user decides to buy insurance for risks that occur with probability less than or equal
to 1. Intuitively, this result makes sense as more risk averse users are more inclined to buy cyber-insurance even
for risks that do not occur with probability (w.p) 1. However, for K > 1, the insurer charges an unfair premium R,
i.e., probability of facing risk × coverage (R) < R = premium charged, to users who face risks that occur w.p <
1, and charges a fair premium to users who are sure to face risk. Thus, the cyber-insurance agency de-incentivizes
higher risk-averse users to buy insurance when they do not face risk for sure, to prevent itself from making negative
profits. The profits made by the insurance company also increase with increase in K, and this is true as more users
buy cyber-insurance, i.e, pL value decreases with increase in K. However, the total user welfare decreases with
increase in its degree of risk averseness. This is due to the fact that our utility function for each user is wealth
based and a user loses more of its initial wealth with increase in its risk averseness. We emphasize here that the
total user welfare is calculated by implicitly taking into account initial precautionary investments of a user. After a
contract is signed between the cyber-insurer and its client, a user can decide on its optimal self-defense investments
and evaluate a different utility function for welfare [23].
B. Profit Maximizing Insurance
In this section, we determine the optimal cyber-insurance policy, (z, c), a cyber-insurance agency solely interested
in maximizing profits (a monopolist) would provide to its customers. Similar to Section V-A2, we assume that a
user can decide whether to buy the policy or not, and that the insurer also has the power to decide whether to
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provide insurance to a customer based on its probability of facing risk.
Problem Formulation. A cyber-insurer primarily interested in making business profits chooses a contract (z, c)
that maximizes its total profit over all users it services. Formally, we frame our unconstrained optimization problem
as follows.
argmax(z,c)
∫ pH
pL
(z − pc)dp,
subject to
A+B + C ≥ 0,
where
A =
∫ pH
pL
[w − z − pK(R− c)]dp,
B =
∫ pL
0
(w − pKR)dp,
C =
∫ 1
pH
(w − pKR)dp,
where pL and pH are defined as above.
Results. We state our result through the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For a profit-maximizing insurance contract, the optimal (premium, coverage) pair is (R K22K−1 , R);
pL =
K
2K−1 ; pH = 1; and the insurer profit, P , equals R (K−1)
2
2(2K−1) .
Proof. Evaluating the integrand in the objective function, we determine the expression for overall profit as
P = c[
z
c
[min{
z
c
, 1} −
z
cK
]−
1
2
[({min
z
c
, 1})2 − (
z2
c2K2
)]]
We observe that the expression is increasing in c. Thus, the cyber-insurer maximizes its profit by setting c equal
to R. When the premium per unit of coverage is less than 1, the expected overall profit is cz2
c2
(K−1)2
2K2 , which is
increasing in z
c
. The increase in total profit is due to (i) increase in sales, which arises due to the increase in the
range of insured individuals, i.e., the difference in the range is pH − pL = zc −
z
Kc
= z
c
K−1
K
, which increases with
increasing premium per unit of coverage, z
c
, and (ii) the mean risk probability also increasing with the premium
per unit of coverage, i.e.,
∫ pH
pL
pdp = z
2
c2
K2−1
2K2 , which increases with
z
c
. When the premium per unit of coverage is
greater than 1 and c = R, the optimal premium is determined by equating the partial first derivative of P to 0, i.e.,
∂P
∂(PPUC) =
z
K2
[K2− z
c
(2K−1)] = 0, which results in a premium z equal to R K22K−1 , where PPUC is the premium
per unit of coverage. The insurer profits when PPUC is less than 1 is R (K−1)
2
2K2 , and equals R
(K−1)2
2(2K−1) when PPUC
≥ 1. Since K2 > 2K − 1 for all K ǫR, the cyber-insurer profits are maximized for PPUC ≥ 1. Substituting the
values of z and c, we get the lower bound of risk probability as K2K−1 . 
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Theorem Implications: We observe that full insurance coverage is the optimal insurance coverage in case of a profit
maximizing scenario. Apart from the case when K = 1, in all other cases of K, the insurer charges an unfair
premium to its client for a reason similar to that mentioned in the implications of Theorem 2. Taking the limit
as K tends to infinity, we infer that the the probability lower bound, pL, for a user lies in the interval [0.5, 1].
The value of pH is obtained from the equation R K
2
2K−1 = pHR. As for insurer profits and individual user welfare,
they increase and decrease with K for reasons similar to those provided in the implications of Theorem 2. We also
observe that for K = 1, the monopolistic cyber-insurer makes zero profits. This result in in accordance with the
result shown by the authors in [15] in the context of monopolistic insurance.
C. Comparison Study
We now draw a comparison between parameters we have evaluated in both, welfare-maximizing as well as
monopolistic contracts.
From the results in Sections V-A2 and V-B, we observe that the optimal premium charged by the cyber-insurers
is more in the case of monopolistic insurers than in the case of social welfare-maximizing insurers, which is
intuitive. For Internet users who are sure to face a risk, the monopolistic insurer charges them an unfair premium
for coverage, i.e., premium > coverage (except when K = 1), whereas for welfare-maximizing insurers, the users
who are sure to face risk are charged a fair premium as insurer is not profit maximizing. We also observe that the
profits made by a monopolistic insurer are higher than its welfare-maximizing counterpart, which is also intuitive.
The total user welfare in the profit-maximizing scenario is w − RK
2(3K−2)
2(2K−1)2 . To compare the total user welfare
in a profit-maximizing scenario with that of a welfare-maximizing scenario, we need to compare the expressions,
K2(3K−2)
(2K−1)2 and
2K−1
K
. Clearly, the former expression is greater or equal to the the latter for all K ≥ 1, equality
holding when K = 1. Therefore, the total user welfare in the case of a welfare-maximizing contract is always
greater than or equal to that of a profit-maximizing cyber-insurance contract, equality holding when K = 1. The
welfare gap for general values of K is R2 · [
K2(3K−2)
(2K−1)2 −
2K−1
K
], which is linear with K - the degree of user risk
averseness.
D. Optimal Cyber-Insurance Contracts Under Information Asymmetry Scenarios
In this section, we model realistic, i.e., imperfect, single insurer cyber-insurance markets and address two
informational asymmetry problems arising between the cyber-insurer and the insured, viz., adverse selection and
moral hazard. In adverse selection, the insurer does not know about the risk category of the user it is insuring,
i.e., it does not have knowledge about whether the user is a high risk user or a low risk-user. Moral hazard results
in a situation where a user behaves recklessly after being insured, knowing the fact that it would be covered. A
cyber-insurance agency is most likely to make losses if it does not properly account for information asymmetry in
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its insurance contract. In this section, we design optimal cyber-insurance contracts under information asymmetry.
Our analysis is suitable to scenarios of non-cooperation amongst Internet users, as we firmly believe that it is quite
unlikely that users would be cooperative in regard to ensuring social welfare and at the same time behave recklessly
themselves.
1) Model: We assume two classes of users, one which has a high chance of facing risks and the other which has
a low chance. We term these classes as ‘LC’ and ‘HC’ respectively. Let θ(1− θ) be the proportion of users who
run a high chance(low chance) of facing risk of size R respectively. However, on grounds of adverse selection the
insurer cannot observe the class of any user. We consider two cases relevant to adverse selection in the Internet:
1) the insurer as well as the insured user have no knowledge about which risk class the user falls in9 and 2) the
insurer has no knowledge of a user’s risk class but the user acquires this knowledge (through third-party agencies)
after signing the contract but before it invests in self-defense investments. We assume that each user in class
i ǫ {LC,HC} invests an amount xi in self-defense mechanisms after signing an insurance contract, which reduces
its probability pi of being affected by Internet threats. We list the following mathematical properties related to our
risk facing probability function p, for users in classes LC and HC .
• p(x) is a twice continuously differentiable decreasing function with 0 > p′LC(x) > p′HC(x) and p′′i (xi) > 0,
i.e., investments by users in class LC are more effective in reducing the loss probability than equivalent
investments by users in class HC.
• pHC(x) > pLC(x).
• 1 > pHC(x) ≥ pLC(x) > 0, ∀x ǫ [0,∞).
We model moral hazard by assuming that the cyber-insurer cannot observe or have knowledge about the amount
of investments made by the insured. Regarding user investments, apart from the self-defense investments made by
a user, we assume a certain minimum amount of base investments of value binv made by an Internet user of class
i prior to signing insurance contracts, without which no user can be insured. Thus pi(binv) is the highest chance
of risk a user of class i may face.
The insurance company accounts for adverse selection and moral hazard and designs an insurance contracts of
the form C = (z, c), for users in class j ǫ {LC,HC}, where z is the premium and c is the net coverage for users.
An Internet user adopts the insurance contract and invests in self-defense mechanisms to achieve maximum benefit.
We measure the benefit of users of a particular risk class i as a utility, which is expressed as a function of contract
Ck and self-defense investments xi. We define the utility function for a users in risk class i and facing a risk of
9This situation may generally happen when the users do not provide truthful information to insurance agency questionnaires and the insurer
cannot estimate the value of correlated and interdependent risks posed to users.
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value R as an expected utility of final wealth, and it is expressed as
EUi(Ck, xi) = pi(xi)u(w0 −R+ ck) + (1− pi(xi))u(w0 − zk), (21)
where w0 is the initial wealth of user i and xi is the amount of self-defense investment it makes and u() is
a increasing continuously differentiable function (u′(xi) > 0, u′′(xi) < 0) that denotes the utility of wealth.
Differentiating Equation 17 w.r.t. xi, we get the first order condition as
−p′i(xi)[u(w0 − zk)− u(w0 −R+ ck)] = 0 (22)
The first order condition generates the optimal self-defense investment for user i that maximizes its expected utility
of final wealth. In the following sections we analyze optimal cyber-insurance contracts under the presence of moral
hazard when 1) neither the insurer nor the insured has any information regarding the risk class of a user and 2)
the insurer does not have information regarding user class but the insured acquires information after signing the
contract but before making self-defense investments.
E. Neither the Insurer Nor the Insured Has Information
An Internet user does not know its risk class and therefore it maximizes its expected utility of final wealth by
setting its probability of loss equal to an expected probability value of pα(x) = θpHC(x) + (1 − θ)pLC(x) and
solving Equation 22. We assume that the values of pLC(x) and pHC(x) are common knowledge to the insurer and
the insured. The cyber-insurer on the other hand, maximizes its profits by offering a contract Cα∗ = (zα∗, cα∗).
The optimization problem related to an insurer’s profit is given as
argmaxzα,cα,λα,ρα,ρ0qα[1− pα(xα)zα − pα(xα)cα]
subject to
Uα(Cα∗, xα∗)− Uα(0, x0) ≥ 0, (23)
−p′α(xα)[u(w0 − zα)− u(w0 −R+ cα)] = 0, (24)
−p′α(x0)[u(w0)− u(w0 −R)] = 0, (25)
where qα is the number of cyber-insurance contracts sold by the insurer and x0 is the amount of self-defense
investments when no insurance is purchased. λα, ρα, ρ0 are the Lagrangian multipliers related to constraints 23,
24
24, and 25 respectively. α could be considered as the risk class that each user feels its in, as it does not have
perfect information about whether its in class LC or HC . Constraint 23 is the participation constraint (Individual
Rationality) stating that the expected utility of final wealth of a user is atleast as much with cyber-insurance as
without cyber-insurance. Constraints 24 and 25 state that Internet users will invest in optimal self-defense investments
so as to maximize their utility of final wealth, and this is in exact accordance to what the cyber-insurer wants (i.e.,
to avoid moral hazard). On route to solving our optimization problem, we derive the Lagrangian [27] and first order
conditions, but omit it in the paper due to lack of space. Our main aim to solve the optimization problem is to
only find whether the solution entails full insurance coverage or partial insurance coverage.
The optimization problem presented in this section10 is an example of a general principal-agent problem. The
Internet users (agents) will act non-cooperatively as utility maximizers, whereas the principal’s problem is to design a
mechanism that maximizes its utility by accounting for adverse selection and moral hazard on the client (agent) side.
Thus, the situation represents a Bayesian game of incomplete information [5]. According to Palfrey and Srivastava
[25], there exists an incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanism [34] for the problem implementable in private
value models, where users do what the insurer desires (i.e., invest optimally in self-defense investments), provided
the constraints in the optimization problem bind, and the users do not use weakly dominated strategies [5] in
equilibrium.
Result and Intuition: The solution to the optimization problem in the binding case tends to full insurance coverage
as the utility function tends to become increasingly risk averse, and partial insurance coverage otherwise. It also
generates a pooling equilibrium contract11, which is unique and entails partial cyber-insurance coverage at fair
premiums. Thus, we infer that a partial insurance coverage is optimal for the cyber-insurer to provide to its clients
as it accounts for the uncertainty of user risk types. Intuitively, a pooling equilibrium works as neither the insurer nor
the insured has any information on user risk type and as a result the cyber-insurer is not at a disadvantage regarding
gaining risk type information relative to the Internet users. The pooling equilibrium establishes the existence of a
market for cyber-insurance.
1) Insurer Has No Information, Insured Obtains Information After Signing Contract: In this scenario, we assume
that the insurer does not have information about the risk class of a user and it cannot observe the risk class if the
user obtains information from any third party agency. Since, the cyber-insurer is the first mover, it will account for
the fact that users will be incentivized to take the help of a third party. We consider the case where the user may
acquire information, and based on the information it decides on its self-defense investments.
Let Uα(Ck, x) be the utility of a user in risk class α for a contract Ck, when it cannot observe the risk class it
10We also note that the optimization problems in the forthcoming sections are all examples of general principal-agent problems.
11A pooling equilibrium is one where the cyber-insurer has the same policy for both the classes (high and low risk) of users and the
contract is in equilibrium.
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is in. Let θUHC(Ck, x) + (1− θ)UHC(Ck, x) be the utility of the same user when it can get information about its
risk class from a third party agency. Thus, we denote the value of gaining information to a user is V I(Ck) and its
defined as
V I(Ck) = θUHC(Ck, x) + (1− θ)UHC(Ck, x)− Uα(Ck, x), 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 (26)
We emphasize that V I(Ck) is zero if there is only type of risk class in the market. Now let xik be the solution to
Equation 18, for risk class i and contract Ck. Since p′LC < p′α < p′HC , for contract Ck, we have xLCk > xαk >
xHCk. Thus, V I(Ck) > 0 due to the following relationship
Ui(Ck, xik) > Ui(Ck, xαk), i ǫ {LC,HC} (27)
The cyber-insurer maximizes its profits by offering a contract Cd = (zd, cd). The optimization problem related to
an insurer’s profit is given as
argmaxzd,cd,λi,ρid,ρi0
∑
i=LC,HC
qi[1− pi(xd)zd − pi(xd)cd]
subject to
Ui(Cd, xd)− Ui(0, x0) ≥ 0, i ǫ {LC,HC} (28)
−p′i(xd)[u(w0 − zd)− u(w0 −R+ cd)] = 0, i ǫ {LC,HC} (29)
−p′α(x0)[u(w0)− u(w0 −R)] = 0, i ǫ {LC,HC} (30)
where qi is the number of cyber-insurance contracts sold by the insurer for class i and x0 is the amount of self-defense
investments when no insurance is purchased. λi, ρid, ρi0 are the Lagrangian multipliers related to constraints 28, 29,
and 30 respectively. Constraint 28 is the participation constraint (Individual Rationality) stating that the expected
utility of final wealth of a user is atleast as much with cyber-insurance as without cyber-insurance. Constraints 29
and 30 state that Internet users will invest in optimal self-defense investments so as to maximize their utility of
final wealth (moral hazard constraints).
Result and Intuition: The solution to the optimization problem in the binding case results in full insurance
coverage if V I(Ck) = 0 and partial insurance coverage if V I(Ck) > 0. If V I(Ck) > 0, which is most likely the
case, a user would prefer to have information on its risk class and accept contract Cd rather than accept contract
Cα∗ (based on utility comparisons). Our optimization problem also generates a pooling equilibrium contract, which
is unique, and entails partial coverage at fair premiums. Thus, we infer that the cyber-insurer finds its optimal
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to provide partial insurance coverage to its clients as it accounts for uncertainty of user risk types. Intuitively, a
pooling equilibrium works as neither the insurer nor the insured has any information on user risk type before the
user signs the contract, and as a result the cyber-insurer is not at a disadvantage with respect to gaining information
on risk type relative to Internet users.
2) Insurer Has No Information, Insured Obtains Information Prior to Signing Contract: In this scenario, we
assume that the insurer does not have information about the risk class of a user and it cannot observe the risk class
if the user obtains information from any third party agency prior to signing the insurance contract. However, in
this scenario a user that knows its risk type is at a significant advantage. Since, the cyber-insurer is the first mover,
it will account for the fact that users will be incentivized to take the help of a third party. We consider the case
where the user may acquire information about its risk type prior to signing the insurance contract, and based on
the information it decides on the contracts and in turn its self-defense investments. We note here that users who
remain uninformed will choose contract CLC as its beneficial for the users to imitate the the low risk type users
than be of the ‘expected’ type.
We denote the value of gaining information to a user as V I(CLC , V IHC) and its defined as
V I(CLC , CHC) = θUHC(CHC , xHC) + (1− θ)ULC(CLC , xLC)− Uα(CLC , xLC), 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 (31)
The cyber-insurer maximizes its profits by offering a contract Cd = (zd, cd). The optimization problem related
to an insurer’s profit is given as
argmaxzi,ci,λi,γij ,ρij ,ρi0
∑
i=LC,HC
qi[1− pi(xi)zi − pi(xi)ci]
subject to
Ui(Ci, xi)− Ui(0, x0) ≥ 0, i ǫ {LC,HC} (32)
Ui(Ci, xi)− Ui(Cj, xj) ≥ 0, i, j ǫ {LC,HC} (33)
−p′i(xd)[u(w0 − zi)− u(w0 −R+ ci)] = 0, i ǫ {LC,HC} (34)
−p′i(xj)[u(w0 − zj)− u(w0 −R+ cj)] = 0, i, j ǫ {LC,HC} (35)
−p′α(x0)[u(w0)− u(w0 −R)] = 0, i ǫ {LC,HC} (36)
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where qi is the number of cyber-insurance contracts sold by the insurer for class i and x0 is the amount of self-defense
investments when no insurance is purchased. λi, γij , ρij , ρi0 are the Lagrangian multipliers related to constraints
32-36 respectively. Constraint 32 is the participation constraint stating that the expected utility of final wealth of a
user is atleast as much with cyber-insurance as without cyber-insurance (Individual Rationality). Constraint 33 is
the incentive compatibility constraint, which states that users prefer to accept contracts that are designed to appeal
to their types. Constraints 34, 35, and 36 state that Internet users will invest in optimal self-defense investments so
as to maximize their utility of final wealth.
Result and Intuition: Our optimization problem generates a separating equilibrium contract12, which is unique
and entails partial cyber-insurance coverage at fair premiums. Thus, even in this case, the cyber-insurer finds it
optimal to provide partial insurance coverage to its clients as it accounts for the uncertainty of user risk types.
Intuitively, a separating equilibrium works as the cyber-insurer is aware of the fact that Internet users have risk
type information before they lay down the contracts and thus plans different contracts for different types. In terms
of optimal contracts and cyber-insurer profits, the insurer is worse off than in the no-information case because in
the latter case, the insurer extracts all user surplus, whereas in the former case, it extracts full surplus from the low
risk type users but only extracts partial surplus from high risk type users. The separating equilibrium establishes
the existence of a market for cyber-insurance.
We have the following proposition based on the results of this section on information asymmetry cyber-insurance
scenarios.
Proposition 1: When neither the insurer nor the insured have any information regarding the risk class of a user,
the cyber-insurer provides full insurance coverage to its users as their utility function becomes limiting risk averse,
and partial insurance coverage otherwise.
If the insurer does not have any information regarding the risk class of an insured, but the insured can gain
risk class information after signing the insurance contract, then an insured who incurs zero cost for obtaining
information finds it optimal to accept a cyber-insurance contract that provides it full insurance coverage while it
finds it optimal to accept partial insurance coverage if the cost of obtaining information is greater than zero.
If the insurer does not have any information regarding the risk class of an insured, but the insured can gain risk
class information before signing the insurance contract, user welfare increases and cyber-insurer profit decreases,
when compared to the previous two cases.
In all the three cases of information asymmetry there exists a market for cyber-insurance for single insurer
cyber-insurance environments.
12A separating equilibrium is one where the cyber-insurer has different insurance contracts for both the classes (high and low risk) of
users and the contract is in equilibrium.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a general mathematical theory of cyber-insurance contract pricing and user security
investments in the Internet for single insurer cyber-insurance markets. We showed that in case of perfect insurance
markets with no information asymmetry, full insurance coverage is the optimal coverage offered by the cyber-insurer,
and cooperation amongst Internet users leads to better user self-defense investments w.r.t. improving overall network
security. In the case of imperfect cyber-insurance environments where users are generally non-cooperative, we
showed that partial insurance is the optimal cyber-insurance coverage offered by a profit-maximizing cyber-insurer.
Through our models, we also show that the market for cyber-insurance exists in single cyber-insurer insurance
models for both, ideal and non ideal cyber-insurance environments.
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